This timely book, written by a veteran diplomat and astute observer, underscores a dilemma in international politics and American foreign policy in the post-Cold War "new world order." A Cold War legacy, the half-century standoff between Taipei and Beijing nevertheless triggers fresh debates and acquires new significance with changing geopolitical and domestic parameters, as the 1996 and 1999 crises portend. This book is to be commended for its balanced analysis of the intractable China-Taiwan problem. Its policy recommendations for managing (but not solving) (p. 87) this dilemma, in which the U.S. has great stakes, are sensible but also predictable.
The author makes three main arguments. First, the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China is shaped by both centrifugal and centripetal forces (p. ix). Increasing economic ties and expanding network of people-to-people links draw them together. But their irreconcilable positions over Taiwan's status ensure mutual antagonism and conflicts. Second, the author believes that "the positive aspects of cross strait, people-to-people relationships far outweigh the negative ones" and can help "temper but not prevent" the deterioration in the two sides' political relations (p. 65). Third, the United States' main goal should be preventing a crisis from developing in the Taiwan Strait that would compel the U.S. to "choose between allowing Taiwan to be subjugated by military force or intervening with U.S. forces to prevent it" (p. 115). He advocates a policy of "strategic ambiguity" that would afford Washington more options to respond as circumstances dictate.
Most of the topics covered in the book have been discussed or debated before, such as changing U.S.-China-Taiwan relations (chapter 2), the "political impasse" over Taiwan's status (chapter 3), the impact of Taiwan's democracy on its quest for international recognition (chapter 5), and the role of the U.S. (chapter 7).
But this book's greatest contribution to the field is the author's painstaking documentation of incidents of cooperation (chapter 4). The most striking example is the agreement between the two sides' oil parastatals to jointly explore oil in the South China Sea (pp. 57-58).
Economic complementarity (p. 51) contributes to a division of labor, with the mainland providing inexpensive land and labor, Taiwan providing capital and know how, and Hong Kong serving as a conduit. The resulting economic integration-a Greater China-fuels the mainland's export boom and maintains Taiwan's prosperity. This pattern follows the "flying geese" model of East Asian development.
However, the author also concedes that both sides' political considerations hamper their beneficial economic ties. "Both governments see risks as well as gains in the economic relationship," he asserts (p. 65). For Beijing, economic interdependence alleviates the tendencies for Taiwan to become independent, but it also strengthens Taiwan's position in the global economy. For Taipei, economic dependence on the mainland jeopardizes Taiwan's security. But creating constituencies on the mainland that have a stake in preserving these beneficial ties and thus oppose PRC's using force against Taiwan can also enhance Taiwan's security (p. 56).
The central question to the author is "whether the forces drawing them together will be sufficient to overcome their political differences" (p. 52)-hence the question mark in the book's title.
If a cooperative strategy has a double-edged sword nature, then a confrontational strategy betrays even more dilemmas. On Beijing's diplomatic squeeze on Taipei, Clough argues that the PRC's unrelenting campaign to prevent the use of the term "Republic of China" paradoxically "encouraged the rest of the world to think of the island of Taiwan as a separate state called `Taiwan,' which functioned independently in the world community and had never been a part of the PRC" (p. 91).
On Taiwan's "pragmatic diplomacy" aiming at international recognition, Clough asks "Can closer symbolic ties with foreign countries counterbalance the increased risk of PRC military action against Taiwan and the effort to strengthen mutually beneficial ties with the PRC?" (p. 25). These sober questions defy easy answers.
In fashioning the proper U.S. role in the China-Taiwan row, Clough insists that the U.S. "must be guided by its national interests" (p. 113). He also asserts, "U.S. interests in expanding global economic interdependence and in democratization would both be served by a Taiwan that was drawing closer to mainland China rather than pulling away" (p. 119).
These premises call into question whether the U.S. has adequately encouraged a democratic Taiwan to become a catalyst for a democratic China, which contributes to America's long-term interests. Ever since the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué established the "one China" paradigm, intellectual complacency has dominated discussions on the complex U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, despite tremendous changes (e.g., the end of the Cold War, Taiwan's democratization, and the Tiananmen movement). Clinging to this "simpler" but outdated framework, some analysts view Taiwan's democracy mainly as a wild card that can seriously disrupt the (more important) U.S.-PRC relations, not as conducive to U.S. values and long-term interests.
Clough shares his concern that if the Democratic Progressive Party candidate wins the 2000 presidential elections, Taiwan may declare de lure independence, prompting the PRC to attack Taiwan and dragging the U.S. into war. But political realities have made DPP politicians pragmatic. The agreements among Taiwan's three major political parties (on Taiwan's de facto independence) are more significant than their differences.
Where this book leaves off spearheads one important future research agenda: the implications of Taiwan's democracy-for Taiwan, for China, and for the U.S. New thinking on U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan is long overdue.
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